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Barings v Coopers & Lybrand; Johnson v Gore Wood; Standard Chartered 
Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp: Some Temporary Relief for 
Auditors? 
 
In an article entitled Subsidiaries’ auditors and their liability, (1997) 18 CoLaw 
333, I expressed some concern at the Court of Appeal’s decision in Barings plc v 
Coopers & Lybrand [1997] 1 BCLC 427 (‘1997 Case’). Coopers & Lybrand 
Singapore (‘C&LS’) was seeking to prevent overseas service of a writ by Barings 
plc (‘PLC’) and Barings Securities Ltd (‘BSL’). BSL and PLC were the 
intermediate and ultimate parent companies of Barings Futures Singapore Pte Ltd 
(‘BFS’), the employer of one Nick Leeson. The writ alleged that C&LS, as 
auditors of BFS, had been negligent in not detecting the loss-making activities of 
Mr Leeson. It was alleged that this was in breach, not just of a contractual (and 
tortious) duty to BFS, but also of a tortious duty to BSL and PLC as the indirect 
shareholder/parents of BFS. 
 
In upholding the possibility of this tortious duty to the parent companies, and thus 
the service of the writ, Leggatt LJ said: 
 
‘In my judgment, the argument about duty of care is concluded by the 
simple fact that C&LS knew that their audit and report on the 
consolidation schedules were required so that the directors of Barings 
could comply with their obligation to provide accounts which showed a 
true and fair view of the financial affairs of the group’ 
 
This use of s 227 Companies Act 1985 (requiring consolidated accounts) to imply 
a duty to parent companies when under the ruling in Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 a shareholder would not otherwise be owed such a 
duty, raised a number of difficult issues. In my earlier article I posed these as a 
series of questions. 
 
‘Is it right that a legal system that firmly maintains that parent companies 
are not liable for the debts of their subsidiaries should also allow parent 
companies to sue the auditors of those companies for negligence? What 
about the double claims (shareholders and company) for effectively the 
same loss that concerned the Court of Appeal in the Prudential case? If 
the resources of a subsidiary’s auditors were limited, such double claims 
might give a parent shareholder a partial preference over its subsidiary’s 
creditors… 
 
Also, what if BFS had been a partly owned subsidiary with outside 
minority shareholders? Would the parent be able to sue, benefiting from s 
227, but the minority not under the ruling in Caparo?’ 
 
There was a danger that this deeply unsatisfactory, albeit interlocutory, decision 
of the Court of Appeal might stand unchallenged because it seems that the various 
Barings companies are now settling their actions with the various parts of Coopers 
& Lybrand. However, before 1993, the auditors of BFS were Deloitte & Touche 
(Singapore) (‘D&T’) and they were also being sued by BFS in contract (and tort) 
and by BSL and PLC in tort. D&T have decided to fight on and this has produced 
two further cases, Barings v Coopers & Lybrand (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] PNLR 16 
and [2002] EWHC 461. Barings No 4 looks at the claims by BSL and PLC and 
No 5 at a preliminary point in the claim by BFS. 
 
In a carefully reasoned judgment in Barings No 4, Evans-Lombe J struck out the 
claims by BSL and PLC against D&T. The claims were that, but for the 
negligence of D&T in failing to spot early losses incurred by Mr Leeson: 
 
1. BSL would not have gone on to lose nearly £400 million lent some 15 months 
later to BFS to finance Mr Leeson’s activities; 
2. BSL and PLC would not have lost their value as companies of £400million 
and £1,000 million respectively when Mr Leeson’s activities brought down 
the whole group 2 years later; and 
3. PLC would not have paid out £12 million excess bonuses on the basis of 
overstated profits in BFS’s 1992 accounts. 
 
In claims 1. and 2. D&T argued that Caparo itself laid down a ‘Purpose Test’ 
which could be defined as follows: 
 
‘Where a claimant claims damages in tort flowing from a negligent 
misstatement he must plead and prove not only that the loss for which 
compensation is claimed was caused by the defendant’s breach of duty to 
the claimant, and was foreseeable, but also that the claim arises from a 
transaction or class of transactions, that was within the contemplation of 
the defendant at the time he undertook the relevant duty and for the 
purpose of which the transaction, inter alia, he provided his services, and 
that the claimant relied on those services for the purpose of that 
transaction.’ 
 
Evans-Lombe J reviewed not just the auditor liability cases but the many recent 
valuer cases and concluded that where the claim is made by a third party for 
negligent misstatement (as against a claim based on contract), such a purpose test 
did have to be met. It is probably spelt out most clearly by Lord Bingham in 
Reeman v Department of Transport [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648, a case alleging 
negligence in inspecting a fishing boat, where he said at 685: 
 
‘The cases show that before a plaintiff can recover compensation for 
financial loss caused by negligent misstatement his claim must meet a 
number of conditions. Among these are three particularly relevant here. 
The statement (whether in the form of advice, an expression of opinion, a 
certificate or a factual statement) must be plaintiff-specific: that is, it must 
be given to the actual plaintiff or to a member of a group, identifiable at 
the time the statement is made, to which the actual plaintiff belongs. 
Secondly, the statement must be purpose-specific: the statement must be                            
made for the very purpose for which the actual plaintiff had used it. 
Thirdly, and perhaps overlapping with the second condition, the statement 
must be transaction-specific: the statement must be made with reference to 
the very transaction into which the plaintiff has entered in reliance on it.’ 
 
Mere knowledge that a subsidiary’s accounts are going to be used by a parent to 
create Group accounts is not enough to plead a claim that the subsidiary’s auditors 
may be liable to that parent as Leggatt LJ had suggested in the 1997 Case. Evans-
Lombe J clearly believed the Court of Appeal to be wrong and in refusing to 
follow it said: 
 
‘The Court of Appeal was considering an application under Ord 11 for 
service outside the jurisdiction. Had the appeal succeeded it would have 
stopped the proceedings against C&LS in limine. Conclusions of law 
arrived at in such application cannot preclude the court of trial from re-
examining those conclusions in the course of a trial.’ 
 
Evans-Lombe J ended this part of his judgment with a reminder of the dangers of 
the ‘but for’ test in a world apparently subject to ‘chaos theory’ (but for the flap of 
a butterfly’s wing etc.). 
 
‘It is circumstances like these which illustrate the necessity for a “control 
mechanism”, highlighted in many judgments dealing with this area of law 
[ie negligent misstatement]. To the outsider it would seem far-fetched that 
the negligence of a subsidiary auditor of one of the minor subsidiary 
companies of a complex and substantial banking group should expose that 
auditor to liability for massive damages flowing from the collapse of the 
entire group, notwithstanding that it can be said that but for his negligence 
that collapse would not have taken place.’ 
 
In striking out claims 1.and 2., Evans-Lombe pointed out that the 1997 Case had 
already been criticised by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood [2001] 2 
WLR 72. Indeed D&T also argued on the basis of Gore Wood that claims 1.and 3. 
were for losses that were merely reflections of the loss made by BFS and could 
only be claimed by BFS. Although he had already struck out claim 1. and was to 
strike out claim 3 on the factual grounds that it was BSL, not PLC that had paid 
out the bonuses, Evans-Lombe did also consider this reflected loss argument. 
 
In Gore Wood, Mr Johnson and his companies had been negligently advised by 
the solicitors Gore Wood. One of the companies, Westway Homes Ltd, settled its 
claim, but later Mr Johnson brought his own action in contract and tort for the 
negligent advice given directly to him. The House of Lords held (Lord Cooke 
partly dissenting) that, in the words of Lord Millett: 
 
‘Where the company suffers loss caused by the breach of duty owed both 
to the company and to the shareholder… the shareholder’s loss, insofar as 
this is measured by the diminution in value of his shareholding or the loss 
of dividends, merely reflects the loss suffered by the company in respect 
of which the company has its own cause of action. If the shareholder is 
allowed to recover in respect of such loss, then either there will be double 
recovery at the expense of the defendant or the shareholder will recover at 
the expense of the company and its creditors and other shareholders. 
Neither course can be permitted. This is a matter of principle; there is no 
discretion involved. Justice to the defendant requires the exclusion of one 
claim or the other; protection of the interests of the company’s creditors 
requires that it is the company which is allowed to recover to the exclusion 
of the shareholder… 
 
Reflective loss extends beyond the diminution of the value of the shares; it 
extends to the loss of dividends… and all other payments which the 
shareholder might have obtained from the company if it had not been 
deprived of its funds… The same applies to other payments which the 
company would have made if it had had the necessary funds, even if the 
plaintiff would have received them qua employee and not qua shareholder 
and even if the plaintiff would have had a legal claim to be paid. His loss 
is still an indirect and reflective loss which is included in the company’ 
claim.’ 
 
BSL and PLC conceded that in respect of claim 1. the loans that had not been 
repaid by BFS were (under this wide definition) reflective of BFS’s losses 
incurred by Mr Leeson. However, it was argued that the reflected loss rule could 
only apply where the company (BFS) had an effective claim. In Gore Wood, Lord 
Bingham has said: 
 
‘Where a company suffers loss but has no cause of action to recover the 
loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it… Where a 
company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder 
suffers a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the company 
caused by breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each 
may sue to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it, 
but neither may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty 
owed to that other… 
 
It is not entirely clear what sort of situation Lord Bingham had in mind, possibly 
the sort of facts that arose Galoo Ltd v Bright Graham Murray [1994] 1 WLR 
1360, where the alleged negligence of the accountants in auditing the accounts: 
 
a. allowed the company to carry on trading at accumulating losses, for which the 
auditors could not be held liable; and 
b. caused a shareholder to pay too much for taking a controlling interest for 
which the auditors might be liable, at least if they knew that that was one of 
the purposes of those accounts.  
 
BSL and PLC attempted to apply it to a case where BFS could not itself sue 
because of an absolute defence D&T might have. D&T were arguing that they 
only signed off on the audit because Mr Jones, the Finance Director of BFS, had 
fraudulently signed a representation letter confirming that the financial statements 
presented to the auditors involved no irregularities, material errors and omissions. 
The actual status of this letter was the subject of Barings No 5. In the meantime, 
Evans-Lombe J held that as settlements and limitations stopping a company’s 
claim, did not free shareholders to seek reflected losses (Gore Wood and Giles v 
Rhind, 24th July 2001, unreported), neither should this defence. In fact, in Barings 
No 5 he held that the letter had not been fraudulent, leaving BFS with a potential 
claim that could stop any claim from BSL and PLC, had any such claim survived 
Barings No 4. 
 
As for claim 3. about the bonuses, BFS and PLC again conceded that if BFS 
succeeded in a claim for negligence in the auditing of the 1992 accounts, then it 
would fail as reflected loss. D&T of course still got the claim struck out on the 
admitted facts. It is interesting, however, that D&T did not attempt to strike this 
claim out using the Caparo argument, presumably because BFS and PLC could 
argue that D&T did know (or at least ought to have known) that the 1992 audited 
figures would be used for such a purpose. But that is only putting the liability of a 
subsidiary company’s auditors to the parent company on the same footing as the 
liability of any auditor to a company’s shareholders. Between Gore Wood and 
Barings No 4 the reasoning of the 1997 case should now be ignored. 
 
To complete the story, however, it is worth looking quickly at Barings No 5, 
which was a hearing just to consider whether D&T had an unanswerable defence 
to the negligence claim in contract and tort brought by their former client BFS. As 
is standard practice with auditors, before signing off an audit and issuing an 
auditors report, D&T required a responsible employee of the audited company to 
sign a ‘representation letter’, confirming in the opinion of that employee that there 
were no irregularities etc.  
 
D&T argued that Mr Jones, the nominal Finance Director of BFS, in fact knew 
little or nothing about the workings of BFS, and made no specific enquiries about 
its workings before signing the representation letter. That letter amounted to the 
opinion of an ‘expert’ that implied that the opinion was founded upon a 
reasonable factual basis. Mr Jones’ behaviour did not just amount to negligence 
(which might give rise to arguments about reducing D&T’s liability) but to 
reckless deceit under the test in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337. Such deceit 
was a cause of D&T signing the audit report, which was a cause of their being 
sued for negligence. In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping 
Corp (No 4) [2001] QB 167, the Court of Appeal held that in cases of deceit, a 
cause is to be treated as the only cause. As Ward LJ said: 
 
‘Commercial fraud must be condemned. It can only properly be 
condemned by an award of the whole of the damage which the defendants 
intended to cause. Highwaymen in commerce forfeit the right to just and 
equitable treatment. In my judgment in the law of deceit there is to be no 
apportionment’ 
 
Mr Jones deceit was in the course of his employment for which BFS were 
therefore vicariously liable and that vicarious deceit should ‘trump’ D&T’s 
alleged negligence and release D&T altogether from liability. 
 
This raises a very difficult public policy issue of whether a company’s normal 
vicarious liability for its directors and other agents’ deceit or negligence should 
release or reduce the liability of negligent auditors whose very purpose is to try 
and reduce the misdeeds of such agents. BFS argued that since the decision in 
Meridian Global Funds Management v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500, 
the courts have some flexibility in what rules of attribution to apply in corporate 
cases. For example, in British Racing Driving Club v Hextall Erskine [1996] 3 
AllER 667, the court had declined to attribute directors’ actions to the company. 
 
However, following two Australian cases, Duke Group Ltd v Pilmer [1999] SASR 
64 and Daniels v Anderson (19950 16 ACSR 607, the latter with startling similar 
facts to the Barings situation, Evans-Lombe J concluded that the normal rules of 
vicarious liability should apply and an auditor’s liability could be so released or 
reduced. The doctrine of vicarious liability can not release auditors from all 
liability for failure to detect fraud, as can be seen from Sasea Finance Ltd v 
KPMG [2000] 1 BCLC 236 and the New Zealand case Dairy Containers Ltd v 
NZI Bank Ltd [1995] 2 NZLR 559. But, on the facts at least as provisionally 
presented in Barings No 5, Evans-Lombe J was not convinced that Mr Jones had 
been recklessly deceitful in any case. 
 
D&T is continuing to fight and the full trial is going to have to come back to this 
very difficult issue (for the Antipodean struggle with it, see (2002) 23 CoLaw 
156). It would also be fascinating to know if any deal Coopers & Lybrand (or 
their insurers) struck took into account D& T’s partial success in the continuing 
litigation. Following Barings No 4, however, the rest of the battered accounting 
profession may for the time being be sleeping a little easier in their beds.  
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